demandside

Bloomberg’s Jason Clenfield reports that “Japan’s economy shrank at a record 15.2 percent annual pace last quarter.  Exports collapsed.  Consumers and businesses cut spending.

The contraction followed a revised fourth-quarter drop of 14.4 percent.   GDP fell 3.5 percent in the year ended March 31, the most since records began in 1955.  This recession is Japan’s worst in the postwar era.

Exports plunged an unprecedented 26 percent last quarter, forcing companies from Toyota Motor Corp. to Hitachi Ltd. to cut production, workers and wages. Stocks have gained 32 percent since reaching 26-year low in March on speculation worldwide interest-rate reductions and spending by governments will halt the slide in the world’s second-largest economy.

GDP fell 4 percent on a non-annualized basis in Japan, more than double the U.S.’s 1.6 percent slide. It’s also worse than Europe’s record 2.5 percent contraction.

…

Still, reports in the past month suggest the world’s second-largest economy may grow for the first time in a year this quarter, albeit from a low point, as exports stabilize and Prime Minister Taro Aso’s 15.4 trillion yen stimulus plan, announced in April, takes effect.

Consumer confidence climbed to a 10-month high in April. Exports increased in March from a month earlier, and factory output rose for the first time since September.

The builder confidence index from the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) increased in May — to 16, from 14 in April.  The record low was set in January of 8.  Below 50 is negative.

Also May 18, the London interbank offered rate, or Libor, for three- month loans slid four basis points to 79 basis points today, the biggest decline since March 19, according to British Bankers’ Association data. It decreased for the past 34 days, including a drop of 11 basis points last week, the most since January.

Anyone with a LIBOR ARM is happy right now.

Calculated Risk relays that

last week, FDIC Sheila Bair said “the liquidity crisis is over for good”. That might be a little optimistic (some auction rate securities markets are still frozen), but it does appear the Fed has eased the liquidity crisis for now. The Treasury is still working on the solvency issues.

“The free fall in the economy seems to have stopped,” Mr. Peter Orszag [director of the White House Office of Management and Budget] said during an interview on CNN’s “State of the Union.” “The analogy is there are some glimmers of sun shining through the trees, but we’re not out of the woods yet.”

I like the “sun shining through the trees” better than “green shoots”. And it’s important to note that only a fraction of the fiscal stimulus has been allocated so far.

Orszag also made an important comment on healthcare: “If you look at the deficit in Social Security, it’s a fraction of the deficit in Medicare. We’re trying to deal with the big problem first.”

Stealth rally in commercial real estate

Goldman says

Perhaps there is a grand technical explanation, but the Markit indices for commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBX) are showing surprising strength in the lower-rate tranches. Why is this obscure and highly technical market of interest to more than a few specialists? Because commercial real estate is one of the most vulnerable asset classes in a downturn and one of the most likely to cause commercial bank losses. The strong performance in lower-rated tranches suggests that the zombie rally in bank earnings will persist through the second quarter. That is, banks will range trade and may even test their previous highs, rather than dissolve into the disgusting puddle of grease that many expect them to. That well may happen, but it’s not happening at the moment.

Commercial real estate delinquencies (6.4%) are rising rapidly, and are at the highest rate since the early ’90s (as delinquency rates declined following the S&L crisis).

Residential real estate (7.91%) and consumer credit card (6.5%) delinquencies are at the highest levels since the Fed started tracking the data (since Q1 ‘91).

Although there is credit deterioration everywhere, the rise in these three categories is especially significant. There was also a significant increase in C&I delinquencies (commercial & industrial).

Note: The Fed defines commercial as “construction and land development loans, loans secured by multifamily residences, and loans secured by nonfarm, nonresidential real estate”, and many of the problems are probably in the C&D loans. These are the loans that will probably lead to the closure of many regional banks.

Also check out the charge-off rates. The charge-off rate for residential real estate increased from 1.58% to 1.8, and for consumer credit cards from 6.33% to 7.49%.

Just more evidence of severe credit problems at the commercial banks.

Total housing starts were at 458 thousand (SAAR) in April, the all time record low. The previous record low was 488 thousand in January (the lowest level since the Census Bureau began tracking housing starts in 1959).

Single-family starts were at 368 thousand (SAAR) in April; just above the revised record low in January (357 thousand).

Permits for single-family units were 373 thousand in April, suggesting single-family starts will remain at about the same level in May.

Note that single-family completions of 549 thousand are still significantly higher than single-family starts (368 thousand). This is important because residential construction employment tends to follow completions, and completions will probably decline further.

“There can be no doubt that besides the regular types of the circulating medium, such as coin, notes and bank deposits, which are generally recognized to be money or currency, and the quantity of which is regulated by some central authority or can at least be imagined to be so regulated, there exist still other forms of media of exchange which occasionally or permanently do the service of money.

…

it is clear that, other things equal, any increase or decrease of these money substitutes will have exactly the same effects as an increase or decrease of the quantity of money proper, and should therefore, for the purposes of theoretical analysis, be counted as money.

In particular, it is necessary to take account of certain forms of credit not connected with banks which help, as is commonly said, to economize money, or to do the work for which, if they did not exist, money in the narrower sense of the word would be required.

…

The characteristic peculiarity of these forms of credit is that they spring up without being subject to any central control, but once they have come into existence their convertibility into other forms of money must be possible if a collapse of credit is to be avoided.”

From the NY Times: Overhaul Likely for Credit Cards http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/19/business/19credit.html

Banks are expected to look at reviving annual fees, curtailing cash-back and other rewards programs and charging interest immediately on a purchase instead of allowing a grace period of weeks, according to bank officials and trade groups.

“It will be a different business,” said Edward L. Yingling, the chief executive of the American Bankers Association, which has been lobbying Congress for more lenient legislation on behalf of the nation’s biggest banks. “Those that manage their credit well will in some degree subsidize those that have credit problems.”

Health care reform legislation must include “a real Medicare-like public option”:

http://robertreich.blogspot.com/2009/05/health-care-cave-in.html

“Don’t make the perfect the enemy of the better” is a favorite slogan in Washington because compromise is necessary to get anything done. But the way things are going with health care, a better admonition would be: “Don’t give away the store.”

Many experts have long agreed that a so-called “single-payer” plan is the ideal… Not surprisingly, insurance and drug companies have been dead-set against a single payer for years. And they’ve so frightened the public into thinking that “single payer” means loss of choice of doctor (that’s wrong — many single payer plans in other nations allow choices of medical deliverers) that politicians no longer even mention it.

On the campaign trail, Barack Obama pushed a compromise — a universal health plan that would include a “public insurance option” resembling Medicare, which individual members of the public and their families could choose if they wished. This Medicare-like option would at least be able to negotiate low rates and impose some discipline on private insurers.

But now the Medicare-like option is being taken off the table. Insurance and drug companies have thrown their weight around the Senate. And, sadly, the White House — eager to get a bill enacted in 2009 rather than risk it during the mid-term election year of 2010 — is signaling it’s open to other approaches. …

It’s still possible that the House could come up with a real Medicare-like public option and that Senate Dems could pass it under a reconciliation bill needing just 51 votes. But it won’t happen without a great deal of pressure from the White House and the public. Big Pharma, Big Insurance, and the rest of Big Med are pushing hard in the opposite direction. And Democrats are now giving away the store. As things are now going, we’ll end up with a universal health-care bill this year that politicians, including our President, will claim as a big step forward when it’s really a step sideways.

I recently spoke at a Federal Reserve conference in Chicago, on financial regulation. The keynote speaker was Ben Bernanke. Chairman Bernanke was unable to leave Washington, so he spoke live, via a giant TV screen, giving his speech a fittingly Orwellian cast.

This was the day that the results of the so called stress tests were released. Not surprisingly, Bernanke was upbeat, since restoring confidence was the whole political point of the stress-test exercise. No major bank was insolvent, and the 19 largest banks collectively needed to raise only about $75 billion in additional capital, although their losses might total as much as $599 billion. Citigroup, queen of the Zombie Banks, remarkably enough, was said to need only $5.5 billion in additional private capital. You could almost make up that paltry sum with executive bonuses.

At one point in his remarks, Bernanke, recounting just how rigorous the stress tests were, explained that “More than 150 examiners, supervisors, and economists” had conducted several weeks of examinations of the banks. That kind of let the cat out of the bag. If you do the arithmetic, that is about seven supervisors per bank, and all of the stress-tested 19 banks were hundred-billion and up outfits. When an ordinary commercial bank, say a $10 billion outfit, undergoes a far less complex routine examination of its commercial loan portfolio, it involves dozens of examiners.

So the stress test was not a set of rigorous examinations at all, but a modeling exercise using the banks’ own valuations of their assets. The most serious outside observers think the hole in the banks’ balance sheets is much larger than $75 billion or even the Fed’s worst-case estimate of $599 billion in losses. The International Monetary Fund estimates the hole as more like 2.7 trillion dollars, and informed economists like Nouriel Roubini put the number at as much as 3.6 trillion.

Why is the Fed low-balling the problem? The hope is that by keeping the banks afloat for a few more months, and trying to entice private capital back to the table, the recovery in other parts of the economy will spill over onto the banks. But the greater likelihood is that weakened banks will continue dragging down the rest of the economy.

Despite talk of “green shoots,” - economic indicators not being quite as bad as expected, and the stock market up - most of the news is still pretty grim. Unemployment was up in April by “only” 539,000 jobs. Home foreclosures keep rising, with a total of eight million projected this year. Manufacturing is dead in the water. The administration’s voluntary (to the banks) mortgage relief program will address only a fraction of the problem; and 12 Senate Democrats voted with the banking industry to deny bankruptcy judges the ability to modify the terms of a mortgage as a last resort - thus killing the one proposed stick in a program that is all carrots.

I also recently spoke at a convention of industrial construction companies. These are the people who build and maintain factories, power plants, and do other heavy industrial construction. I asked a room full of hundreds of executives how many saw signs of improvement in their order books. Not a single hand went up. Then I asked how many had had projects deferred because of difficulty getting financing. About two thirds of the people in the room raised their hands.

My guess is that the Obama administration will be back next fall, asking Congress for the money and authority to do the bank rescue right, after the current policy proves inadequate to restore the banking system and the economy to health. That would mean taking the insolvent banks into receivership, deciding how much public capital was required and where to get it, and then returning the banks to private ownership. Better late than never, but it’s a pity to waste six months.

Chatting with the bankers in attendance at the Fed conference, mostly bankers from the heartland of the Midwest, I encountered resentment bordering on fury at the double standard. The big Wall Street banks are getting propped up with literally trillions of dollars in aid from the Treasury and the Federal Reserve, while community bankers that stuck to their knitting and did not go in for the sub-prime swindle are suffering collateral damage. That’s a pun, by the way.

Because of the huge losses to the FDIC’s insurance fund, small and medium sized healthy banks are having to pay increased premiums. And while the Fed and the Treasury are being extremely gentle in letting the big money-center banks like Citi value their distressed securities with great charity and forbearance, the community banks are having their loan portfolios examined with fine-tooth combs. With regulators breathing down their necks, and fewer sure-thing businesses in a position to borrow, the community banks are being made to raise their lending standards, contributing to the vicious circle of reduced business activity and reduced credit.

Why had the administration made this perverse alliance with Wall Street, and decided to prop up large zombie banks rather than taking them into receivership and getting on with it? You could blame it on campaign finance, or you could blame it on the quirk of history that Obama, once he became the nominee, decided to hire the Wall Street-oriented Clinton economic team.

The most hopeful and elegant theory I’ve heard is that for now, Obama’s main political project is to let the Republicans self-destruct; co-opting Wall Street (for now) is part of that game plan. He’ll get around to reforming Wall Street next year. Even Roosevelt had to take things one step at a time, as public opinion moved. The Second New Deal was more radical than the first. I’ve often said that Obama is smarter than I am, and if he is politically shrewd enough to have come up with that strategy, hats off to him. I’m also a Red Sox fan, and anything is possible. But for the moment, it looks more like a case of political expediency and even political capture.

I could excuse all that if the Geithner-Summers-Bernanke strategy of low-balling the scale of the banks’ problems and inviting speculators to bail them out actually worked. But the greater likelihood is that the economy will tread water at best for the remainder of this year, losing both precious time and political credibility in America’s heartland.